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ABSTRACT 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Our long-time experience in palliative care 
allowed us to notice changes in ethics of palliative 
medicine. In the handbook of palliative medicine, 
its authors R.G.Twycross and D.Frampton in 1995 
did formulate the following ethical postulate: 
respect for life, acceptance of death of a patient as 
an unavoidable event, respect for a patient as a 
person, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice. In 
addition, they stressed prohibition of euthanasia as 
a rule. Nine years later, however, in the Oxford 
handbook of palliative care, its authors: 
M.S.Watson, C.T.Lukas, M.A.Hoy and J.N.Back 
described their ethical basis, which were slightly 
different but quite similar to those of 
T.L.Beauchamp and J.F.Childers: autonomy of a 
patient, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice and 
the trust. Their set of principles may induce 
controversy because of unlimited patient's 
autonomy and absence of physician's autonomy. 
Further, it may permit euthanasia, which is 
excluded by palliative medicine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the moment of its origin in the 6
th
 
decade of the XX
th
 century, paradigms of 
palliative-hospice care have included, apart from 
pharmacological treatment of physical symptoms, 
necessity of analysis of psycho-social, 
intellectual, moral and ethical problems of 
patients during their terminal period of incurable 
diseases.  
 The 18-year-long experience of the 
Cracow Palliative Care Centre has given us the 
possibility of observing transformation of this 
type of therapy and care. The changes that 
followed its development were noted not only in 
pharmacotherapy of pain, cachexia and other 
physical symptoms but also in psycho-social, 
intellectual, moral and ethical problems of the 
patient in his/her last phase of the illness.   
 It seems these changes, ethic ones, in 
particular, may cause some controversy and 
change of paradigms of the palliative care in near 
future. Quite often, ethical and philosophic 
changes are strictly related with social and 
political state of a country. In Poland, secular and 
liberal tendencies have been experienced recently. 
Thus, the following question seems to be 
essential: do the ethical evolution changes are 
good and advantageous for patients, for medicine 
and the whole society now and in the future?  
 
DISCUSSION 
  
 The question of bioethics in palliative 
medicine relates mainly to ethical problems of so-
called “terminal situations," particularly to 
problems of mental suffering caused by agony 
and approaching death. They are the most 
remarkable and of model character in this medical 
specialization and as such can serve as a pattern 
of behavior and material for analyses in other 
branches of clinical medicine.  
Some of these issues are given below:  
 Autonomy of a patient; its scope, in 
particular  
 Autonomy of a physician (therapist)  
 Welfare and good standing of a patient  
 Dignity of a patient and a therapist  
 Quality, value and sanctity of life  
 Selection of the model of physician-patient 
relations  
 Selection of the model of clinical medicine 
and its current “autonomy”  
 Influence of these problems on society.  
 These problems may be interpreted in 
various ways at the patient's bed. Differences 
in this area come mainly from different 
ethical theories, which determine our 
medical behavior and selection of a model of 
mutual relation between a physician and 
patient.  
From among several ethic “theories," the 
most popular are:  
 Consequentialism  
 Deontonomism  
 Personalism  
 So-called “colloquial ethic" which is, to 
some extent, a “relic” of ethical discussions, 
which had been carried on before a scientific 
bioethics originated. It is worth stressing 
here that the election of an ethical model is 
most of all related to the philosophy of life 
accepted by an individual.  
   From this point of view, it is essential 
to distinguish differences in understanding of such 
ideas as a person, his/her dignity and autonomy, 
absolute good (welfare, well-being) of a patient 
and of a person in general meaning, ethos of the 
clinical medicine, etc.  
 Consequentialism which includes 
utilitarianism of acts and of rules says the good 
of an individual or society – derived out of our 
activity and being its consequence – is the base of 
an ethical valuation. When a conception of a 
person is discussed, its approach is of relative 
character because it says we are becoming 
persons gradually during our lives. However, we 
can be excluded from the category of persons in 
some circumstances. The above-mentioned 
statement is based on the enunciation that a 
person must have and show some specific 
attributes of which consciousness and possibility 
of deciding of his or herself are dominant (J. 
Fletcher – 15 indicators of humanity) [2]. 
Individuals who are deprived of these dominant 
and deciding attributes have been called - 
somewhat strangely - “moral subjects” or “past 
persons” by followers of the utilitarianism. 
Human fetus as well as young children who have 
not acquired these attributes are denominated as 
“future persons” [3,5].  
Leaving the merits of the conception for 
future discussion, it may be stated here that these 
facts undoubtedly depersonalize some members 
of humanity and may deprive them of the rights 
and protection which have been guaranteed by, 
among others, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights voted by the U.N.O. in 1948.  
In the future, this specific terminology 
may bring negative results for clinical medicine 
since it may be understood as a scientific base for 
change of present critical attitude to legalization 
of euthanasia. The palliative-hospice movement is 
firmly against such postulates because of its 
paradigms, which absolutely exclude the 
possibility of each and all forms of euthanasia. It 
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says the value of life of a patient must not depend 
on quality of his or her life.  
 Utilitarianism says a person's quality of 
life is essential and defines and qualifies the value 
of life. If it is low, life “is unworthy of live” 
according to foundations of utilitarianism (E. 
Shelep – the principle of minimum of 
independence). These statements may serve as 
grounds for legalization of euthanasia in future 
[2]. Further, they are contrary to postulates of 
personalism and its rule of sanctity of human life 
even though it is of very low quality.  
 The trend of ethics which is based on 
personalist philosophy does underline dignity of 
the person from its conception until his or her 
natural (biological) death. The trend says the 
existence of a human being does not depend on 
possessing of attributes (consciousness, for 
example); it is so because attributes describe and 
characterize persons but do not create them, they 
are derivative and secondary to being. The 
personalist model of ethics says also a human life 
must not be a medium to achieve any goals, 
neither particular nor general ones. By this, it 
supports “the principle of sanctity of human life." 
All the principles of the personalist philosophy do 
exclude euthanasia of a patient, nevertheless, the 
quality of his/her life, the degree of damage of the 
body as well as the patient's request expressed as 
his or her own decision [2].   
At this point, it is proper to mention those 
trends of ethics, which are based on 
deontonomism as well as recall the essence of so-
called “ethics colloquial."  
 Deontonomism (deon – duty, obligation) 
motivates ethical rules by some authority. We 
distinguish two forms of deontonomism: 
heteronomous where the rules are imposed on 
people - by the law, for example – by creation of 
specific rules or codes (medical code, for 
instance); alternatively, autonomous where me, 
myself and my convictions are the authority [2].  
 Fast development of bioethics since the 
second half of XXth century made it an important 
part of philosophy, which does possess its own 
scientific base, trends, nomenclature, etc. 
Because of said development, so-called “ethics 
colloquial” - being a set of subjective views that 
are relatively often based on emotional reactions, 
which sometimes exclude each other - may not 
play a significant role in medicine. However, 
quite often are analyses of ethical problems that 
are made either out of existing scientific ethical 
models or with their total omission. Such an 
ethical judgment – disregarding solutions of these 
problems by above mentioned ethical theories – 
must not be a ground for binding conclusions. 
Among others, we think here of such problems as: 
legalization of euthanasia, assisted-suicide, 
falsifying the patient's hope by telling him or her 
untruth about prognosis, etc.   
 There is more than one type of relation 
between a practitioner and a patient. At present, 
there are three main models of the relation:  
 Paternalism – patient does fully depend on 
a physician during the therapy, and the 
physician can exercise quite a large 
autonomy.  
 That's why a new pattern of practitioner-
patient relation has been developed in 
English-language countries at the end of the 
XX th century:  
 Principism (T. L. Beauchamp, J. F. 
Childres, 1983) with its five ethical rules 
(principles): autonomy of the patient, 
beneficence, nonmaleficence justice and the 
trust [1].  
The model seems to be good and meeting 
expectations of both a physician and a patient. 
However, the practice has revealed the fact that 
lack of scientific determination of principles may 
lead to serious consequences, particularly in 
palliative-hospice care. Lack of determination of 
patient's autonomy is one of the possible negative 
reasons; it sometimes causes faulty understanding 
of patient's autonomy – as the rule or principle 
which is absolutely and totally binding a 
physician. Further, absence of physician's 
autonomy in his/her relations with the patient 
quite often makes the physician's autonomy 
decrease or be completely neglected; it may cause 
moral dilemmas in a physician's mind when a 
patient - equipped with an absolute autonomy - 
requests the physician to act contrary to his or her 
hierarchy of values. It may strike the ethos of 
clinical medicine as well. We are talking about, 
among other's patients, request of euthanasia, 
abortion, eugenics, cloning, etc.   
 The model of unlimited autonomy of a 
patient opens the door to full commercialization 
of medicine. This will lead to the end of 
Hippocratic model of medicine. Furthermore, 
such an unrestricted autonomy of patient's 
decisions may somewhat “anarchic" society by 
such demands as, for example: “I am free in 
requesting physician to do everything," “I don't 
care of what other people will think of such a 
medicine."  
 There is also the third model of a 
physician-patient relation. However, it is 
disregarded quite often, unjustly in our opinion. It 
is based on the theory of personalist ethics and is 
called beneficence in trust (E.Pellegrino, 1988). 
Here, the physician-patient relation is grounded 
on balance and equilibrium between autonomy of 
both and on dignity of both as well - which all 
determine the scope of decisions of the patient 
and the physician [4].  
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Sometimes, ethical problems are resolved 
by amicable settlement (agreement) by parties 
who represent different ethical standpoints. It is 
called “contractalism”. However, we think such 
an improvised solution should not be used in 
palliative care, particularly in issues of shortening 
of patient's life.  
 When the ethical ground of palliative-
hospice practice is observed from its beginning to 
the present moment, evolution changes can be 
noticed. Principles which have been formulated 
by its originator Madame Cicely Saunders were 
generally adopted by the World Health 
Organization when “palliative medicine," a new 
clinical specialization, came into existence.  
 According to “Palliative Care of a Patient 
in Agony” by R.G.Twycross and D.Framptom, 
1996, ethical grounds of the specialization were as 
follows:  
 Respect for life  
 Acceptance of inevitability of death  
 Respect for the patient who is a human being.  
 Doing good  
 Not doing evil  
 Reasonable division of available means [6].  
When the above rules were discussed in details, 
the paradigm of prohibition of euthanasia of the 
patients was underlined.  
However, a handbook of palliative care that 
was published nine years later (in 2005) by 
S.M.Watson. C.F.Lucas, A.M.Hoy, J.N.Back [7] 
enumerates main ethical rules in slightly different 
way: respect for autonomy of the patient, 
beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice  
  As can be seen, the acceptance of 
inevitability of death and definition of a patient as 
a human being are omitted. It is easy to note these 
rules are nearly the same as ethic postulates 
regarding mutual relations between a physician 
and a patient that were given by T.L. Beauchamp 
and J.F. Childress in 1983 – same as those of so-
called principism. Significant is that they were 
known in the days of creation of the new medical 
specialization (palliative medicine) but were not 
taken into account by its founders [1].  
 The present model of palliative care 
system does underline the inevitability of death 
but does not accept legalization of euthanasia of a 
patient – neither active nor passive or hidden one. 
Also, existing limitation of autonomy of a patient 
by physician's autonomy influences the now 
existing ethos of clinical medicine of discussed 
specialization.  
 Reasons of the attempts to change ethical 
grounds by some authors are not quite clear. We 
suppose they may be the result of widening of 
scope of palliative medicine by patients suffering 
from non-tumor diseases and being in their last 
period, whose therapy in English-language 
countries is based on principism of Beauchamp 
and Childress. The model, as it was stated before, 
stresses the patient's autonomy and may, in some 
circumstances, permit euthanasia.  
 Controversial situations may arise when 
physicians of palliative medicine meet employees 
of health centres in Holland and Belgium where 
euthanasia is legally permissible. In said 
countries, the practice of resignation of “special 
extraordinary therapeutic methods” in palliative 
care centers in Great Britain or Poland for 
example is seen – wrongly in our opinion – as a 
sort of passive euthanasia. Similarly, “terminal 
sedations" are considered by them (by Holland 
and Belgium's centres) to be a hidden form of the 
active euthanasia which is actually performed in 
those countries where euthanasia is not allowed.  
 At this point, it seems to be necessary to 
explain that decrease of suffering of a patient – 
not shortening of his or her life – is the intention 
of both stopping of special therapeutic methods 
and terminal sedation. So, speaking of euthanasia 
is quite inadequate here. Returning to the 
discussion about causes of changes in main 
ethical problems of palliative care, it should be 
noted that global tendencies to make clinical 
medicine become a commercial might be the 
reason of the changes. Said changes need wide 
autonomy of a patient who in turn brings 
withdrawal of the autonomy of a physician who 
otherwise, based on his or her conscience, may 
block extreme ideas of some consumers of the 
“commercial” medicine which – apart from its 
traditional tasks – performs such controversial 
“services” as change of sex, abortion, prenatal 
eugenics and euthanasia [2].  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. There comes a question: whether the attempt 
to change ethical principles by acceptance of 
the model of Beachamp and Childress 
(principism) is aimed at creation of ethical, 
supposed to be scientific, grounds for 
acceptance of euthanasia in the future? The 
question, although in Poland, it is a problem of 
far future rather, seems to be of some 
importance.  
2. If so it happens, the main paradigm of the 
palliative movement – ban of euthanasia – will 
have to be withdrawn. But would it still be the 
palliative-hospice medicine?  
3. On the other hand, development of palliative 
care must undergo some evolution-type 
changes. At the moment, questions about 
changes that would be good for a patient, for 
ethos of medicine and for the society as well, 
seems to be well grounded.  
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